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The household sector is both a propagator of shocks to the economy, as wealth is redistributed 
across households with differing propensities to consume, and an originator of risky claims held in 
systemically important places, as losses are shifted from households to creditors such as financial 
institutions.  Information about these exposures, like information generally, is conveyed by prices and so 
is under-produced by markets.  Thus increased public collection, analysis, and distribution of information 
on household exposures to macroeconomic risk factors can potentially lead to better macroeconomic 
performance, both through better informed private decision-making and through better public policy.  
This note describes a system for monitoring, measuring and publicizing exposures to and from 
the household sector. This system, called the LEADS system, is designed to provide market participants, 
regulators, and households with additional information to understand the reallocation of resources within, 
from, and to the household sector in response to macroeconomic events.  The LEADS system has three 
components, of which the first is the main focus of this paper.  The first step is the collection of data on 
LEADS – Liabilities, Earnings, Assets, Demographics, and financial Sophistication – at the household 
level.  I argue that these categories are the key dimensions to measure, that measurement at the 
household-level is critical for accurate measurement, and that much of this information is available in 
institutions already subject to government oversight and reporting requirements.  The second step in 
LEADS is the measurement of the exposure of each asset, each liability, and each income stream to 
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macroeconomic risk factors.  This step is the subject of much of the field and practice of finance, and 
describing the vast and evolving set of techniques for this step is beyond this paper.  This component of 
the system requires historical data on returns (at a minimum) and modeling of future exposures.  
The final step is analysis and release of information.  I propose analysis of the outcomes of 
changes in risk factors in four important dimensions: the distributional impacts on both liquid wealth and 
lifetime wealth; the resultant changes in household demand; the effects of balance sheet adjustments on 
the prices and payouts of claims on the household sector held by other sectors; and the resulting impact on 
the revenues and liabilities of the government, through possible transfers and de jure and de facto 
guarantees to the household sector. Such projections necessarily involve household decisions. This 
information on exposures across groups of households is then combined with information on financial 
sophistication.  Where exposures – to or from the household sector – are large and sophistication low, 
macroeconomic risks may be mispriced or amplified by lack of sophistication and knowledge.  Finally, 
the results of the analyses are made public – potentially pushed in some cases to ‘unsophisticated’ 
households – and the underlying data made public in a suitably limited form that maintains privacy. 
Together the LEADS system would uncover information relevant to addressing the following 
types of questions that are of interest to market participants and policymakers: 
•  How risky are loans to the household sector? Is a particular type of aggregate risk 
concentrated among households with few resources or little sophistication and so 
represents a potential source of losses for other claims on these households?  
•  Is a particular type of macroeconomic or systematic risk held primarily by households 
with little financial sophistication and so potentially mispriced? 
•  How exposed is consumer demand to declines in different assets or asset classes?  Is a 
particular type of aggregate risk concentrated in liquid wealth or on households whose 
demand is highly sensitive to losses? 
•  How likely are private losses to become public liabilities? Is a particular group of 
households, like pensioners, holding enough of a specific macroeconomic or systematic 
risk so that losses might lead to ex post public assistance?  
With very narrow exceptions, these questions cannot be answered by analysis of existing datasets. 
This paper -- and the NBER Initative on Systemic Risk and Macro Modeling of which it is a part 
-- are both motivated directly by the credit market disruptions and financial crisis of 2007 and early 2008, 
the contemporaneous declines in asset values, and the large macroeconomic consequences.  At the time, 
most observers expected that the decline in demand for investment and consumption goods following 
these events would be similar to that caused by the stock market decline in the year 2000 and to be 3 
 
concentrated on the construction sector (e.g. Bernanke (2008)).
1  In fact, consumption demand fell 
significantly during the Great Recession – more than output – and has been slow to recover after (relative 
to most previous U.S. recessions).   
The financial crisis and recession of 2008 - 2009 illustrate the two main ways in which the 
household sector is important for measurement of systemic risks.  First, household demand is critical for 
business cycles, and as such the monitoring of households’ balance sheets and wealth is a natural part of 
the monitoring of macroeconomic risks.  Second, systemically important institutions hold claims on the 
household sector, and so that understanding the correlated risks of these institutions requires 
understanding the value of these claims in different macroeconomic scenarios.
2  Section I contains a 
discussion of these issues. 
Section II presents the structure of the LEADS data and describes how this structure allows one to 
measuring aggregate risks to and from the household sector.  Section III describes how the LEADS data 
can be collected and compiled.  Current sources of information are disparate, do not cover the same 
households, lack sufficient detail on asset holdings, and do not measure household sophistication.  The 
dataset for the LEADS system can be constructed by merging administrative data on investments and 
debts with a panel survey of households that focuses on demographics, income and financial 
sophistication.   
Section IV discusses analysis and dissemination.  Analysis of the data can use existing tools used 
in the study of financial risks and household finances.  I sketch a three-step procedure to first measure 
individual-asset exposures, calculate liquid wealth and lifetime wealth exposures, and map these back to 
changes in household demand and in the value of claims on households.  To allow better management of 
aggregate risks, the analysis, summary data, and an anonymous random sample of detailed data should be 
released to the public.  Section V concludes, and an appendix discusses the role of the government in the 
provision of this type of information.  
 
I.  Why monitor household exposures? 
The exposures to and from the household sector are important for monitoring and measuring 
aggregate risks for three broad reasons. 
First, movements in household expenditures amplify and propagate shocks to the economy.  This 
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consumption, and as a house values decline, the (opportunity) cost of housing falls, providing insurance to 
households that own homes. Further, the structure of mortgages provides households with an option that increases in 
value when house prices decline, transferring wealth from high-wealth high-saving households to low-wealth high-
consumption households.  
2 This stands in contrast to the Japanese banking crisis and slow growth of the 1990’s, during which financial 
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was true in the recession of 2008-2009: during and following the recession, sluggish household 
expenditures have amplified and propagated slowdown.  This has also been true more broadly.  As Hall 
(1986 and forthcoming) shows, the volatility of GDP comes primarily from household spending.  And 
long slumps from the Great Depression to the recent recession are arguably amplified by low consumer 
demand due in part to debt overhang (e.g. Melzer (2010)).  
 Since households own firms and are the government, household demand is exposed to 
macroeconomic risks through changes in aggregate income and aggregate asset values (and gains or 
losses on net asset postions with foreign countries).  Thus, a major part of risk in household demand can 
be measured from aggregate data on the share of wealth held in different asset classes and an evaluation 
of the riskiness of each asset class.  But household-level data on individual asset holdings and their 
characteristics can provide a better understanding of the exposure of aggregate demand to asset values.  
Any decline in any asset value has a disporportionate impact on household demand if it is 
accompanied by transfers among households of differing propensities to consume.  This disproportionate 
effect can happen for example if shocks redistribute resources between middle-aged households, whose 
behavior is reasonably approximated by the lifecycle model, and younger households, whose behavior is 
better characterized by the buffers stock model of consumption.
3  In the recent recession and in the Great 
Depression for example, household demand seems to have been reduced by the concentration of losses 
among households with leverage.
4  
Thus, the household sector has historically been an important proximate source of output 
volatility and the household sector’s response to wealth changes is determined by the distribution of 
wealth changes both across households and across two measures of wealth: short-term, liquid, financial 
resources and long-term illiquid wealth, such as retirment accounts or future income.  
The second reason to monitor household exposures is that both the government and systemically 
important institutions hold financial claims on the household sector. The ability of households to meet 
these clams and not default in different macroeconomic scenarios determines the exposure of these assets 
to systematic risks and thus the extent to which those holding the financial claims are exposed. 
In the recession of 2008 – 2009, a significant reason for the depth and severity of the recession 
was large losses on loans to households that were held by systemically important financial institutions.  
                                                           
3 See Carroll (1997) and Gourinchas and Parker (2001).  Kaplan and Violante (2011) provide a related model. Most 
current models of the macroeconomy are largely linear, even those with heterogeneous agents, so that the 
household-level data is not necessary in these models for predicting macroeconomic dynamics. This statement even 
applies to models with precautionary saving that match the large share of households with low wealth (Krusell and 
Smith (1998)), although these models typically miss the volatility of asset markets. 
4 See Fisher (1933), Eggertsson and Krugman (2010), Hall (2011).  Parker and Vissing Jorgensen (2009, 2010) find 
larger consumption declines for high consumption or high income households, implying an important role for 
declines in asset prices and expected future prospects of high-income households. 5 
 
These exposures may well have been smaller had the exposures to aggregate risk factors of the various 
dimensions of wealth of the households with mortgages been better understood by market participants or 
regulators. 
The final reason to monitor household exposures is that, like groups of banks, the government 
cannot commit ex ante not to make large transfers to groups of households following adverse outcomes.
5  
And in general, monitoring is helpful in dealing with the moral hazard problems that accompany 
insurance. These types of assistance are public risks that expose aggregate growth to the risks born by 
these households through increased tax rates and decreased future spending and benefits.  
Examples of governments assisting a subset of households that lose significant resources include 
those following natural disasters, and the bailout of the elderly following the Great Depression with the 
Social Security System (enacted in 1935 and 1939) which paid retirees benefits starting in 1940 to aid 
seniors whose wealth was wiped out by the Great Depression.
6  As long as the government ex post makes 
transfers to households that have suffered large losses, it is optimal for the government, like any private 
insurer, to monitor these households and react to these risks.
7 
These are the reasons that market participants and policymakers benefit from information on 
household asset holdings, but why should the government gather, analyze and publicize this information?  
There are two main reasons, addressed in more detail in the appendix.  First, as a general principle, in 
markets the social value of information exceeds its private value, so information is under-produced by the 
market.  Given too little information, mistakes are made relative to the economy with the socially optimal 
amount of information.  And mistakes will tend to be based on the common information that exists, so 
that mis-estimation leads to coordinated mistakes which are by definition macroeconomic.  Second, lack 
of financial sophistication (such as lack of financial knowledge, limited information processing abilities, 
and limited time allocated to financial decisions) can lead some households to misprice aggregate risks, 
both leading to misallocation by other sectors and exposing household demand and claims on households 
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6 And we may observe it if the PGBC fails or some US states go bankrupt. On the other hand, households facing 
foreclosure in the current recession were not bailed out.  What little assistance that was provided – the Home 
affordable Modification Program which affected less than a million mortgages – focused on overcoming an ex post 
market inefficiency rather than being a transfer to households.  Also, there was no government rescue for the 
employees of Enron or Arthur Anderson, nor for the victims of the Madoff fraud. 
7 In terms of regulatory response, the government can simply disclose these exposures so that government 
accounting is more informative, or the government can hedge the exposures so that tax rates can be smoothed and 
market prices better reflect true risks, or finally, it can restrict or intervene to deter the exposures ex ante that lead to 
bailouts in some states ex post. 6 
 
to ‘mispriced’ aggregate risk factors.
8  While it is efficient to have the downside economic risk held by 
those most willing to hold it, it is generically inefficient to have it held by those least able to understand it 
or who most underestimate it.  
It follows from these considerations that data collection and analysis should focus on measuring 
the systematic exposure of two measures of household financial wealth –liquid financial resources over a 
few years and lifetime wealth – for not just the household sector but also for different households grouped 
according to consumption response to these two measures of resources, according to their importance for 
claims on the household sector, according to the likelihood of losses being born by the government, and 
according to measures of financial sophistication of the household decision makers. 
 
II. LEADS data 
What information is required to measure exposures to and from the household sector?  First, 
household-level data is necessary so that the common risks of different types of households can be studied 
across both different groups and risks of interest. That is, while the units of analysis will typically be 
groups of households, to characterize exposures among groups of households with differing propensities 
to consume for example, one has to have information for many possible groupings defined by 
demographics and/or financial measures of interest such as liquid wealth or homeownership status.  
Individual-level data allow the study of the history of exposures and behavior of different groups or types 
of households through different aggregations of historical data.  Further, to calculate the exposure of 
claims on household resources to an aggregate shock, one needs to model the default of each household 
which again is most straightforward (and requires the least extraneous assumptions) using household-
level data.  For example, to predict how much default would accompany a ten percent decrease in house 
values for a group of households, it would be useful to know not just that the average loan to value ratio 
of households in that group was 80 percent, but also the distribution of loan to value ratios and how 
correlated other household assets and incomes were with the considered aggregate risks. Finally, the study 
of household-level data is a useful input to risk calculations, such as under what conditions households 
default or how different regulations might change household behavior.  That is, household-level data 
allows one to use existing variation in laws, regulation, prices, etc. across households to study and 
measure household behavior and thus infer better what losses to and from the sector would occur in 
response to what aggregate events.  
In terms of the information on each household, following the arguments in section I, the data 
should contain enough detail on assets, income and liabilities to accurately measure the extent to which a 
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household’s liquid wealth and lifetime wealth are correlated with macroeconomic risk factors.  This 
requires knowledge about the nature of income, of assets held in each asset class, and of credit terms for 
debt, so that the impact of changes in each on liquid wealth and on total wealth can be calculated.  For 
example, holdings in retirement accounts clearly expose lifetime wealth and not liquid wealth, while 
temporary shocks to income affect liquid wealth more than lifetime wealth.  In sum then, a system to 
monitor systemic risk in the household sector requires data on assets and liabilities both at the household 
level and in enough detail to assess their roles in liquid wealth and lifetime wealth. 
What actual financial information about households is needed?  As in the monitoring and 
regulation of the U.S. banking system, one would like to observe sufficient detail about household 
balance sheets to accurately measure the exposure of each asset and liability to aggregate risk factors of 
interest.  To this end, the data should contain information not just on the holdings in any asset class, but 
on the actual details of the securities held.  It is insufficient to measure the risk of a class of assets, 
because one group of households may differ significantly from another in the actual securities held within 
that class and so actually have quite a different exposure to a macroeconomic risk factor.  As examples, 
among mortgages, the extent to which household default will differ dramatically with the terms of the 
mortgage.  Stocks can have high exposure to aggregate risk or provide insurance against aggregate 
shocks.  Hedge funds can be highly levered and lose money in response to credit shock, or provide 
liquidity in a credit shock and be highly profitable. 
A similar argument applies to labor and benefit income.  One needs to know enough details of the 
labor income of the household to measure the exposure of labor income to macroeconomic risk factors to 
measure the household’s ability to avoid default or bankruptcy.  Some households have stable labor and 
benefit incomes and others are highly exposed to the business cycles.  The actual exposures, as for assets, 
can be estimated from existing data on historical labor incomes of similar households.  And benefits and 
income amounts from each source are necessary to infer total exposure.  
Finally, an important part of monitoring banks is the quality of management and its plans for 
future contingencies.  The measurement of financial sophistication in the household sector is similarly 
important for measuring and monitoring risks and for providing clues as to which risks might be 
mispriced.  In banking regulation, the quality of management informs the regulator about the likelihood 
that the financial institution can manage the exposures inherent in the bank’s asset and liability positions.  
In the recent financial crisis, measurement of this dimension for Fannie Mae and AIG Financial Products 
would have shown poor management practices, been easy to correlate with massive exposures to real 
estate prices and price impact, and potentially been useful to other investors taking prices as informative 
about riskiness of mortgage backed securities.  While poorly managed firms tend to suffer a Darwinian 
fate, this argument has little bite for households living well above subsistence.  And regulation today 8 
 
reflects this: regulations restrict most households from making many investment choices, which are 
available only to qualified investors.
9 
While financial sophistication has many dimensions, the most pertinent to measure is the extent 
to which households are informed about aggregate risks and their exposures to them.  If households are 
not informed, that is not proof that they are incorrectly exposed, but it suggests that greater information 
about exposures might change behavior for the better.  The measures, discussed below, capture the extent 
to which households are informed about the financial decisions they are making, the extent to which they 
have the abilities to make reasonable financial decisions, and the extent to which they exhibit 
characteristics correlated with good financial decision making.  We would better understand 
macroeconomic risks if we were always able to observe when credit was increasing to households with 
low financial sophistication and when households with low financial sophistication were increasing their 
exposures to macroeconomic risks. 
In sum, the needed data is information collected at the household level on the following 
categories, summarized in Table 1: Liabilities, Assets, Earnings, Demographics, and financial 
Sophistication.  The system is named for the capitalized letters: LEADS.  Table 1 also highlights what is 
missing from current data sets.  The two main missing items are 1) the details on assets and liabilities at 
the household level and 2) measures of financial sophistication. 
The fact that the LEADS data would contain a host of information on household financial 
positions raises important issues of privacy.  It will be necessary to insure the anonymity of households in 
any summary statistics released to the public or limited datasets released to researchers.  I do not address 
these issues in this paper, but merely note that these issues are of great import and surmountable.  They 
are important, as the provision of accurate information in part relies on the confidence of the provider that 
the information will not be misused. That these issues are surmountable is shown by the regulation of the 
banking sector in which bank regulators have been able to preserve the privacy of confidential bank 
information.
10 
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unlikely to have been useful in monitoring the systematic risks and in avoiding them, since closely related data was 
available. The information in credit ratings bureaus showed that subprime borrowers had very poor credit ratings, 
which probably correlates highly with lack of financial sophistication.  But this does not mean that this type of 
information will not be useful next time.  In the next potential crisis, it might be that households take on more risk 
than they intend absent LEADS-type information, or that markets or regulators would find information on the 
sophistication of the households driving financial flows to be a useful signal to help interpret price movements and 
measure macroeconomic risks. 
10 The IRS has also not allowed leaks of confidential tax return documents while allowing researchers to use the data 
for important social scientific research. 9 
 
 
III. How to collect the LEADS data 
How could a statistical agency gather the LEADS data?  While the details of the system could 
rival the documentation of the measurement of risk in the traditional banking sector, in short, there are 
several principles that are necessary to gather this information. 
First, the collection of data must rely heavily on administrative data.   Survey response rates are 
declining, and administrative data is increasingly detailed, already computerized, and has low rates of 
error.  Even cooperating households with good intensions are likely not to know the details of their 
financial contracts or holdings.  This happens in two ways.  The household may simply not know the 
details of the asset or liability that are available to them, like a household not knowing the aggregate and 
idiosyncratic risks of the returns on a stock they own, or whether their mortgage gives the lender recourse 
or not, or the covenants and seniority of a bond they own.  Or the household may not have access to this 
information, as would be the case for a household holding a mutual fund or hedge fund, or having its 
investment advisor allocating its assets. 
This information however is available through financial institutions, all of which are already (or 
seemingly will be) covered under the large umbrellas of financial regulation and reporting.  The 
organizations that sell the assets or hold claims on households either understand the details of the 
payments that must be made in different states of the world or have on file the terms of the mortgage 
contract, CUSIP of the security, etc.  One approach is for the appropriate regulator to gather reports on all 
financial holdings by or against a given household by all financial entities.
11  The gold standard for 
information on financial positions – assets and liabilities – is administrative data from universe of 
financial institutions, merged by household for a subset of households.  The universe of financial 
institutions would have to include everything from hedge funds to payday lending to limited 
partnerships.
12  Even if this is not completely possible, it seems necessary to rely as much as possible on 
administrative data to avoid significant loss in detail on holdings. 
Could statistical agencies use private companies that serve households and collect financial 
information, such as Mint.com?  Data from these private money management companies suffers from a 
serious shortcoming: the sample of the population they cover are not representative of households in the 
United States.  These data cover only households that choose to manage their finances and do so on-line.  
                                                           
11 There are questions of feasibility and privacy issues that this paper does not address. Presumably one could gather 
this administrative data with the consent of the surveyed household.  Another option would be to require universal 
reporting by financial institutions for certain types of financial transactions.  Household information is gathered by 
credit bureaus and households wishing to engage in certain financial transactions are also choosing to be monitored.  
Tax law requires reporting of all dividends.  
12 It is unclear how to handle international holdings, although one could cover a large portion through intermediaries 
who sell (or lend) from abroad. 10 
 
Households that use these types of services are not the average household, and in particular they probably 
display more than average financial sophistication -- certainly in the dimension of planning --  and so 
likely have different wealth and incomes and take different financial risks. 
 Second, household demographics are probably most accurately gathered by a household-level 
survey or possibly even simply gleaned from existing household surveys.  Administrative data may 
provide better coverage, since any household survey will suffer the problems of surveys, including 
potentially low response rates. But much of the basic demographic and even income data already exists 
for many households in several extant datasets.  Using the various surveys of households conducted by 
the Census Bureau, combining data across existing datasets within the US government at the household 
level could yield an accurate picture of household demographics and income. With household permission, 
the government agency could merge this extant survey data with the financial information provided by the 
financial sector to create a close-to-ideal dataset.  A further improvement would be to merge with the 
income and tax return data in the Internal Revenue Service.
13 There are of course many hurdles to these 
coordinated efforts, including issues of consent, issues of biasing responses and data provision, and issues 
of interference with the primary missions of the original datasources. 
Third, financial sophistication can be measured using a combination of data from financial 
institutions and survey methods.  Financial institutions have information on household choices and 
responses to financial offers.  These responses have been used by economists to measure financial 
sophistication in behavior from dominated choices (see Agarwal et al (2009, 2010)).  Detailed holding 
can also be used to ask to what extent observed behavior conforms to an economic model’s views of what 
optimal behavior ought to be (see for example, Calvet, Campbell, Sodini (2007, 2009)).  In either case, 
financial institutions have some existing information on the quality of financial management within a 
given household.  However, this information is unlikely to prove sufficient, and the collection of this type 
of information may distort the incentives for financial institutions to create the information. 
Complementarily, many dimensions of financial sophistication can be measured by suvey 
methods, as shown by existing surveys.  A notable example is the Financial Industry Regulatory 
Authority (FINRA)’s National Financial Capability Study.  At this point however, there is insufficient 
previous research on the usefulness of different dimensions of sophistication to know exactly which 
questions or information will be most useful.  And to some extent flexibility must be maintained in data 
collection so that measures can evolve with the financial situation and the risks percieved as potentially 
most interesting. 
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Despite these caveats to measurement of financial sophistication, three types of data are 
potentially useful indicators of suboptimal responses of household spending or mispricing of claims on 
the household sector.  The first type of information is measures of household contingency plans for 
macroeconomic events of interest.
14  This information would be useful directly for understanding default 
on credit instruments and indirectly for modelling whether expectations of actions are inconsistent across 
households (and potentially financial institutions).  The information that everyone plans to run for the 
same exit in the event of a fire is useful information for households themselves.   
The second class of useful information concerns whether households understand the financial 
products they are using.  Lack of understanding would suggest suboptimal exposure to macroeconomic 
risk factors, and potentially exploitation leading to increased aggregate exposures.  Of course this is far 
from proof, as illustrated by the analogy of the pool player who plays well but does not understand 
classical mechanics.
15  But there is strong evidence that measures of this type of financial sophistication 
are correlated wtih financial choices.
16  
Note that the motivation to measure macroecomomic risk exposure is distinct from the motive to 
protect investors that is the goal of the newly legislated Consumer Financial Protection Agency.  While 
the methods may overlap and data be of interest for both purposes, the measurement of aggregate risk 
exposures requires a focus on common misunderstandings which align with measured exposures.     
Finally, the third dimension of sophistication to measure is general abilities and behaviors related 
to good financial decisions making.  For example, saving for retirement is much larger among households 
that report that they plan for vacations (Ameriks, Caplin, and Leahy (2003)).  While is is proably not 
realistic to measure IQ for these purposes, IQ does correlate with financial decision making (Grinblatt, 
Keloharju, and Linnainmaa (forthcoming)). 
Turning to the structure of the data, for accurate measure of systemic risk, it will generally be 
necessary that all data be in the same dataset – that is that one has all LEADS information for a set of 
households.  Short of this, if groups of interest can be defined based on observables that are measured in 
two different datasets, then the group averages can be constructed for each group in each dataset and 
combined.  For example, if assets, liabilities and income are well measured in one dataset with 
demographics and financial sophistication is well measured in another dataset with demographics, then 
one can calculate statistics about financial sophistication for any demographic group.  What one cannot do 
                                                           
14 Brunnermeier et al (2011) provide a modeling strategy for financial institutions that makes use of these type of 
questions of financial institutions. 
15 Note that an important aspect of the analogy is inconsistent with our modeling of agents as pool players.  There is 
no uncertainty in pool. If an economist’s agent played pool in theory, it would always win by sinking all the balls in 
the right order on the first shot. 
16 See for example, Lusardi and Mitchell (2007). 12 
 
is observe if, within any demographic group, it is the less sophisticated households that are holding 
particular assets held by that group and not other assets.  With some loss of accuracy, one can extrapolate 
from a small sample with complete information to a larger sample with information on different 
dimensions for different households.  
Finally, to what extent is repeated cross-sectional data sufficient or would the LEADS system be 
significantly stronger with panel data that follows the same households over time?  The risks of assets and 
liabilities require that one track the performance of these assets, and not that one track the same 
households over time.  To measure income dynamics and correlations with macroeconomic risks requires 
repeated measures of a household’s income, but there are datasets from which measures could be 
constructed with long time series already.  The Panel Study of Income Dynamics, the Current Population 
Survey, and the Social Security Earnings Records in the Health and Retirement Study all provide long 
histories of earnings on households that could be mapped to demographics and then applied to households 
in the new dataset.  I expect that the heterogeneity within a demographic group missed by this method 
would be of little systemic interest.  That said, repeated cross-sectional data will reduce the power of 
many measures, particularly when studying household-specific changes to better understand behavior or 
when tracking the impact of changes over longer periods of time. 
 
IV. Outline of  LEADS data analysis and dissemination  
The LEADS system is designed to allow the measurement of the exposure of the liquid wealth 
and lifetime wealth of different groups of households to different macroeconomic shocks and the 
construction of measures of the exposure of both aggregate consumption demand and claims on the 
household sector to these macroeconomic shocks.  This section first outlines a framework for analysis of 
three steps: i) measure the risk exposure of each asset, each liability, and each income stream to 
macroeconomic risk factors; ii) aggregate exposures to household-level liquid wealth and lifetime wealth 
and then aggregate exposures to groups of households; iii) model the exposures of aggregate consumption 
demand, claims on the household sector and government liabilities. Second, dissemination of both 
analysis and anonymous raw data is critical.  While regulators may find patterns of exposure informative, 
the private sector also can better respond to and price risks when it is better informed of their aggregate 
consequences as would be the case if it had access to both the analyses and some of the data. 
To begin, the measurement of the risk exposure of assets and liabilities should be based on 
textbook asset pricing and all the difficulties of the real world.  This part of the analysis of the LEADS 
system is not novel and is reasonably well understood. I simply propose standard modeling of asset and 13 
 
debt cash flows that makes up the bulk of quantitative finance and fundamental analysis.
17  Returns, cash 
flows, and prices, are described as a sum of exposures (beta’s) times realizations of aggregate risk factors 
and idiosyncratic or deterministic components.  Modeling income risk is similarly reasonably well 
understood and applied in labor economics.  Here “understood” does not mean straightforward.  Perhaps 
the most important assumptions are those about the behavioral responses over the period studied in cases 
where these responses affect cash flows, which as noted subsequently, may depend on other holdings of a 
given household.  
Given estimated exposures, the liquid wealth of a household can be written as a sum of stochastic 
cash flows into and out of liquid assets from income, assets, and liabilities, and of terminal prices of 
liquid assets and liabilities.   And the lifetime wealth of a household can be written similarly but for all 
assets (not just liquid assets).  Thus, we would have measures of the exposure of these two concepts of 
wealth to variation in aggregate risk factors.  Finally, aggregating across households, one calculates the 
implications of a change in any set of aggregate factors for the liquid wealth and lifetime wealth for any 
group of households.  
The third step in analysis is to use a model of the consumption sensitivity of different households 
to these two types of wealth to measure of the exposure to aggregate risk factors of the aggregate demand 
for consumption.  As discussed shortly, this requires modeling household behavior.  But having modeling 
household saving, consumption, default, and portfolio behavior, the LEADS system provides a measures 
of the exposure to default of any set of claims on the household sector.
18  Finally, one can examine under 
what scenarios there are significant direct or possible effects on the government budget through explicit 
or implicit guarantees or legislative responses.  
As noted, the modeling of household behavior is a critical step in the construction of both income 
and asset/debt outcomes and as well as household consumption, saving and rebalancing in response to 
events.  In short, we need to model how households respond to changes over any horizon considered. In 
terms of risks to the household sector, most relevant are exposure of household income, where cash flows 
depend on household labor supply responses, and exposures of household debt, where the household can 
choose to exercise an option to default or change portfolio or saving behavior.   In terms of outcomes, the 
LEADS analyses needs to model household consumption behavior to understand which how the demand 
of different households are more and less exposed to macroeconomic events.  Further, to understand 
                                                           
17 One danger going forward is that new financial products have limited histories and so are potentially the most 
subject to mis-estimation. 
18 Similarly, given decision rules about portfolio choice, one can evaluate the change in asset demand from the 
household sector. With assumptions about the potential other buyers of the asset, one can check the aggregate risk 
factor exposures are reasonable or reasonably consistent with the household responses. 14 
 
claims on households, one has to make assumptions that determine the situations in which households 
default.  Fortunately, many of these behaviors have been or can be measured from past experiences and 
existing data, so that modeling assumptions can be disciplined by data.  Further, one advantage of 
LEADS data is that, because it represents a significant increase in the quality of available information, it 
will increase the ability to learn about these behaviors from future events.  Nevertheless, given the 
importance of these assumptions, any analysis will have to carefully evaluate robustness to alternative 
assumptions. 
Household financial sophistication may be quite useful in modeling household behavior.  
Household decision rules may differ importantly with financial sophistication. The second use of financial 
sophistication is in grouping households for analysis, in combination with information on exposures.  
Where exposures – to or from the household sector – are large and sophistication low, this is suggestive 
that macroeconomic risks may be mispriced or amplified by lack of sophistication or information.  
In sum, the analysis should produce information on the exposure of aggregate demand to various 
risks, information helpful for the private sector and the government. The analysis measures the size of 
risks emanating from the household sector, and allows them to be evaluated and tracked into other sectors 
of the economy. Finally, the analysis contains information on the potential costs to the government in 
terms of likely payouts through automatic means-tested programs and possible payouts through ex post 
bailouts to subgroups of the household sector. 
Finally, the LEADS information is made public, in three ways.  First, the results of the analysis – 
the range of possible impacts on aggregate demand and defaults and asset prices for many aggregate 
scenarios under any assumptions – are made public.  This dissemination can lead to many benefits, as 
discussed in section I and the appendix.  Further, if regulators were concerned about the possibility of 
‘unsophisticated’ households unintentionally holding too much risk, then particular results about riskiness 
could be pushed to the type of household that might most benefit from this information.  Similarly, if 
regulators were concerned about the exposures of some market participants, they again could highlight 
the risks and allow participants to react to the information as they see fit.  
Second, a dataset of aggregated data is made publically available for analysis and investigation by 
academics and investors. Ideally this dataset would combine analysis and raw data. A large number of 
government agencies produce detailed table based on data that they collect through surveys. A reasonable 
model for the LEADS summary data is the published tables based on the SCF. But the LEADS tables 
would be better if summary statistics were released by demographic groups of possible interest including 
financial sophistication, and if the focus were not on current value of holdings but on asset detail and 
riskiness.  Further, it would be useful to observe not just mean holdings, but covariances of holdings 
across assets within a group and quantiles of holdings – both of which would allow a better understanding 15 
 
of the possibility that large shocks lead to large movements for some households in the group. Finally, the 
statistics should to the extent possible convey information about exposure to both liquid wealth and 
lifetime wealth. 
 Third, a household-level dataset would be made accessible to researchers working to improve 
our understanding or modeling of macroeconomic risks and financial stability.  This dataset should be 
insufficiently detailed as to allow identification of individuals.  The dataset would be useful to bring new 
evidence on the behavioral assumptions inherent in the extant measures of systematic exposures.   
 
V. Conclusion 
Macroeconomic shocks can lead to large changes in demand from the household sector and can 
lead to large changes in cash flows from debt claims on the sector.  The LEADS system outlined in this 
paper is designed to measure sufficient detail on household Liabilities, Assets, Earnings, Demographics, 
and financial Sophistication, to project these large changes.  
This LEADS system would help households, firms and policymakers determine what sources of 
aggregate risk are most pertinent for claims on the household sector and household demand and when 
these exposures are likely to be large. More specifically, the system is designed to allow measurement of 
i) the distributional impacts on both the distribution of liquid wealth and lifetime wealth, and the resultant 
changes in household demand; ii) the effects of balance sheet adjustments on the prices and payouts of 
claims on the household sector held by other sectors; and iii) the resulting impact on the revenues and 
liabilities of the government, through possible transfers and de jure and de facto guarantees to the 
household sector.  While the scope of the LEADS system implies that this paper can only provide an 
overview of the system, methodologies exist for most of the individual component tasks. 
While it is beyond the scope of this note to lay out a complete framework for macroprudential 
data analysis and regulation of the household sector, the analogy between banks and households suggests 
that policymakers want to consider three tools.  First, policymakers might consider capital requirements, 
such as existed in mortgage markets in practice in the period of the conforming mortgage.  A related 
system is the Social Security system which guarantees/imposes a basic standard of living for elderly 
households by requiring young households to pay while working for health insurance and basic retirement 
income when elderly.  Second, policymakers might consider restrictions on what financial assets 
households can use.  This regulation is in place as restrictions on what investors can invest in unless they 
are qualified investors.  It seems suboptimal to make this determination based on wealth – errors are made 
both by excluding sophisticated investors from markets and by allowing wealthy unsophisticated 
investors to invest in any assets.  A better regulation would license an investor on the basis of a test, like 
required to get a driver’s license to drive.  Finally, the regulator may want to inform the public and warn 16 
 
them about specific exposures, or even lean against the wind and try to change prices, limit access, or tax 
certain investments or strategies that they see as destabilizing.  A good data measurement system is an 
essential guide to evaluate the benefits and, just as important, the costs of any potential active regulation. 17 
 
Appendix 
Why the government has a role in monitoring household systemic exposures 
There are two benefits to measuring the exposure of the household sector to systemic risk.  
First, as a general principle, in markets the social value of information exceeds its private value.   
Because information has some of the features of a public good, markets tend to lead to the production of 
too little information.  This result comes from the power of markets to create efficient allocations given 
the available information.  Prices aggregate and convey information to market participants and optimizing 
agents can coordinate behavior to efficiently produce and allocate goods.  However, this benefit implies 
that when an individual produces information, others benefit.  Thus the social value of information 
exceeds its private value.  
When there is too little information, mistakes are made relative to the economy with the socially 
optimal amount of information.  And mistakes will tend to be based on the common information that 
exists, so that misestimation leads to coordinated mistakes which are by definition macroeconomic if not 
systemic.  And misestimation propagates.  Misestimation of the positions of the household sector can lead 
to systemic risk elsewhere.   
This externality implies that there is a role for a governmental or quasi-governmental agency to 
produce information.  This is not a new role.  The government does this for a large number of 
macroeconomic variables. The government also regulates the production and disclosure of information by 
firms.  The goal of this paper – and this NBER project – is to modernize data production and provision, 
updating it to account for the modern financial landscape and redirecting some of its focus from the 
measurement of means to the measurement of standard deviations – risks, and macroeconomic and 
systemic risks in particular.   
There are many potential benefits of more information. Market participants would be able to 
allocate resources more efficiently across potential outcomes given better information on exposures to 
aggregate risks in places in the household sector.   Better measurement of the risk exposure of consumer 
demand and claims on household resources also would allow the government and the market to better 
predict consumption demand, and so better understand risks given their observed prices. 
The second reason that the government has a role in monitoring household exposures is that some 
households lack financial sophistication, due for example to lack of financial knowledge, limited 
information processing abilities, and limited time allocated to financial decisions. Thus, some households 
can make significant financial mistakes relative to the decisions they would make if they had the ability 
and took the time to collect and process fully all available information and knowledge.  The provision of 
information about the holdings of agents with different levels of sophistication can make behavior closer 
that of the full-information or full-sophistication economy, which can increase the information content of 
prices, and lead to better private decision making and better management of systematic exposures. 
When the mistakes of market participants are common, they can lead to noise or bias in prices 
which other agents are using as sources of information for their choices, and may lead to large a systemic 
exposure of both household demand and claims on households.
19  In financial markets, financial 
institutions that all expect to be able to sell the same assets or all draw on credit but fail to recognize the 
extent to which other institutions have made the same plans create a systematic risk.  For households, this 
mis-estimation can create a similar dynamic or exposure.  In the recent crisis, households that had planned 
on using home equity to stabilize consumption across bad shocks found that credit was available only at 
                                                           
19 A typical argument is that agents do not make similar mistakes over many time periods, not that many agents do 
not make similar mistakes at the same time. 18 
 
very high prices and that their collateral values had declined further limiting the extent of borrowing.   
Further, when a sophisticated/informed investor observes a price, they must try to infer the 
information in this price.  This inference can involve estimating the shares of price movement caused by 
agents with different levels of motivation and sophistication trading in the market.  And so the inference 
could be improved by information on these shares – whether observed prices are due to the actions of 
other sophisticated/informed investors or instead the actions of unsophisticated investors or ‘noise traders’ 
whose choices are not based on as much information or are motivated by different concerns.  For 
example, a large exposure among a group of households that are (in some sense) making unsophisticated 
choices can distort prices and pass systematic risk through the household sector into other parts of the 
economy through default on claims on the household sector.   
Public provision of information about the sophistication of groups of agents who are holding 
different assets can partly reveal how informative market prices are and again can lead to better private 
sector decision making.
20     
Finally, while it is efficient to have the downside economic risk held by those most willing to 
hold it, it is generically inefficient to have it held by those least able to understand it or who most 
underestimate it.  Lack of sophistication can be exploited and there is always the risk that this exploitation 
can cause systemic exposure.
21   A signal of the size of systemic risk is its price.  And regulators 
interested in regulating systemic risks need to be able to observe clues as to whether the risk is correctly 
priced and correctly placed.   
Thus, data should be informative about whether downside economic risk is being shifted to the 
unsophisticated part of the household sector, or passed through the unsophisticated part of the household 
sector to other systemically important sectors.  This argument implies that data collection should support 
these types of inference and should be designed to provide the information necessary for market 
participants and good regulatory responses.  There may be situations where aggregate risk can be reduced 
by some consumer financial protection, where regulation of financial choices may avoid “unintentional” 
systemic exposures.
22  Even without government intervention, information on sophistication is likely to 
be useful for targeting the provision of information about systemic exposures (or the provision of the 
implications of analysis of systemic exposures), with the goal of allowing household and firm choices that 
are more consistent with those that they would be made given complete information.  
                                                           
20 This information would allow lenders to these households to observe their sophistication, which can be useful as a 
signal of the quality of their financial decision making in other areas.  Thus, an investor with insufficiently detailed 
information (or sophistication) to evaluate the exposure of the household balance sheet might still learn from the 
disclosed abilities of households that are holding certain assets. 
21 While not a group of households, one can make the argument that AIG financial products by mispricing credit 
default swaps on mortgage backed securities lead market participants to underestimate the exposure of these assets 
to aggregate risk and lead to its being held in systemically important places.  Unsophisticated households could play 
a similar role in the next crisis. 
22 The field of economics has a long history of taking individual choices as optimal and basing policy advice on 
arguments that rely not on individual mistakes but on market failures due to externalities for example.  Both of the 
previous arguments  --  that markets naturally produce too little information and so there is a government role in the 
provision of information  -- are in this spirit.  However, the field tends to ignore the possibility that agents differ in 
sophistication and sophisticated agents can regulate the behavior of the unsophisticated and improve welfare. The 
general commitment to the sovereignty of the decision-maker is the real divide between behavioral economics and 
the rest of the field.  In cases where sophistication is about education and information, in theory, revealed-preference 
tests and utility constructs could lead to welfare measures that proscribe such regulations as welfare improving in the 
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Table 1. An Overview of LEADS for Households 
 
Data at the household level on: 
 
Liabilites  Measure terms of each borrowing instrument and calculate exposure -- collateral  
  information,  commitment/term,  interest rate determination, penalties, etc. 
 
    Details almost completely lacking in current datasets 
 
Assets  Details on each investment, including restricted accounts like retirement.  
Examples: name of hedge fund, actual security, house address, etc. 
 
    Details almost completely lacking in current datasets 
 
Earnings  Measure of current and past incomes at the household level as well as dynamics 
 
     Current datasets strong (PSID, NLSY, CPS, ACS, IRS) 
 
Demographics  (age, family structure, geographic location, occupation, industry, etc.)  
For grouping households into groups to study exposure, for public data 
 
Details available not tied to data other than earnings and course measures of 
assets and liabilities 
 
Financial Sophistication  
Measures of households expectations and subjective probabilities of different 
scenarios, and responses to tests of understanding of investment choices and 
consumption smoothing in the markets in which they are operating 
   
Completely lacking in current datasets 
 